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I. INTRODUCTION
[1] A virtual environment is a presentation of a virtual world to a real
person, as if the person were virtual and in that world.1 The most
ubiquitous examples today of virtual environments are multiplayer online
games such as World of Warcraft2 and Project Entropia.3 These games
provide thousands of users from all over the real world with persistent
virtual worlds and consistent personal representation in the virtual world
in the form of characters. The characters interact with each other within
the virtual world. In fact, players spend ten hours per week building up
the strength and abilities of their characters.4 This process is called
“leveling up.”5 The higher the player’s level, the better the player is at
battling other characters and monsters, casting spells, flying spaceships,
* Michael Meehan holds a Ph.D. in computer science and his research areas include
computer graphics, virtual environments, and multiuser systems. Dr. Meehan expects to
receive his J.D. from Stanford University in May 2007. Dr. Meehan would like to
acknowledge the contributions of Barbara Fried, Thomas Grey, Richard Craswell, and the
students in the Stanford Law School Legal Studies Workshop. Without all of you, this
project could not have been completed.
1
Hal Berghel, Virtual Reality is Virtually Here, CYBERNAUTICA, Jan.-Feb. 1997,
http://berghel.net/col-edit/cybernautica/jan-feb97/pcai_97a.php.
2
World of Warcraft, http://www.worldofwarcraft.com (last visited Dec. 18, 2006).
3
Entropia Universe, http://www.entropiauniverse.com (last visited Dec. 18, 2006).
4
Lev Grossman, Bloody Ethics, VILLAGE VOICE, Feb. 9-15, 2000 (“The average ‘citizen’
spends between 17 and 20 hours a week playing Ultima [Online], and more than half log
on every single day.”), available at
http://www.villagevoice.com/news/0006,grossman,12395,8.html.
5
See Wikipedia, http://www.wikipedia.com (search “leveling up”) (last visited Dec. 18,
2006).
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etc. Additionally, different areas of the virtual world presented in the
game may be accessible only to players whose characters have attained a
certain level.6
[2] As the players navigate their characters through the virtual world and
battle monsters, aliens, or other players, they can acquire or create in-game
assets or “virtual property.” Often, when a monster is killed, treasure in
the form of virtual property is left on the corpse.7 In other cases,
performing certain tasks or completing certain missions results in the
acquisition of virtual property.8 These in-game assets can include virtual
currency, virtual armor to help protect the characters from attacks by other
characters, virtual weapons to help inflict damage on enemies, enchanted
virtual items to make the characters stronger, virtual real estate to raise the
status of the characters and possibly provide them with a source of virtual
currency,9 or any other virtual item that may be an asset to the user’s
character.10
[3] Another form of virtual property is a player’s game account. This
account provides the player with the right and ability to play particular
game characters.11 When a game player sells a character account, the
player is usually selling the password to the account, thereby allowing the
purchaser to play the character and take ownership of any virtual property
associated with the character.12
6

See id.
World of Warcraft: Parties, http://www.worldofwarcraft.com/info/basics/parties.html.
(last visited Dec. 18, 2006).
8
World of Warcraft: Quest Basics,
http://www.worldofwarcraft.com/info/basics/questbasics.html. (last visited Dec. 18,
2006).
9
See Secondlife: The Marketplace, http://secondlife.com/whatis/marketplace.php (last
visited Dec. 18, 2006). See generally Entropia Universe, supra note 3.
10
See Entropia Universe: Apply for Account §§ 6-7,
https://account.entropiauniverse.com/pe/en/rich/5185.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2006);
World of Warcraft: Item Basics, http://www.worldofwarcraft.com/info/items/basics.html
(last visited Dec. 18, 2006).
11
See Mike Musgrove, Virtual Games Create a Real World Market, WASH. POST, Sept.
17, 2005, at A1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/09/16/AR2005091602083.html.
12
See id.
7
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[4] Sales of virtual property happen daily and are often made via eBay or
other online auction sites.13 Character accounts regularly sell for hundreds
of dollars.14 Thus, players are willing to pay hundreds of dollars to enter
the game with a character account that would otherwise take much time to
develop. Rare virtual items regularly sell for tens to hundreds of dollars.15
Virtual real estate is often the most expensive. In the game Project
Entropia, a virtual island sold for over $26,00016 and a virtual space
station sold for $100,000.17 Some of these sales are made by regular game

13

After a real-world sale on eBay or elsewhere, the game players transfer the virtual
items between their characters. The transfers are often negotiated via the game’s text
chat or an offline instant message or email system. Once an agreement has been reached,
items are traded between the characters within the game. During the trade, a graphical
trade confirmation interface appears on each game player’s computer, displaying what
each side is willing to give to the other. The appearance of the items in the trade window
lets players be sure of exactly what they are giving and receiving. See World of Warcraft:
Trading, http://www.worldofwarcraft.com/info/basics/trading.html (last visited Dec. 18,
2006). For example, if a player buys a virtual sword via eBay, then she will arrange for a
“virtual meeting” with the seller’s character in order to receive the virtual sword from the
seller. In World of Warcraft, there is also a “mail” service with which sellers can “mail”
some virtual items and thereby obviate the need for a virtual meeting of players’
respective characters. World of Warcraft: Mail,
http://www.worldofwarcraft.com/info/basics/mail.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2006). If the
seller is the game company itself, the company simply places bits representing the virtual
property in the game player’s virtual inventory. Edward Castronova estimated in
December of 2001 that the average per capita yearly income of game players in the game
Everquest was about 180,000 Norrathian Platinum Pieces, which, at the time, was
equivalent to about $2,266. This income made Norrath the 77th richest country in the
world. Edward Castronova, Virtual Worlds: A First-Hand Account of Market and Society
on the Cyberian Frontier 31-32, 33 (CESifo Working Paper No. 618, 2001), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=294828.
14
At the time of this writing, on eBay, one World of Warcraft character account had
already been bid to over $1,000 and numerous others had been bid to over $600. See
Ebay, http://www.ebay.com (last visited Dec. 18, 2006).
15
At the time of this writing, on eBay, a “Godly Crystalline Sword” in the game Guild
Wars was on sale for $50 and World of Warcraft in-game currency was selling at a rate
of approximately 20-25 virtual gold per U.S. dollar, depending on the amount purchased.
Id.
16
Gamer Buys $26,500 Virtual Land, BBC News, Dec. 17, 2004,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/4104731.stm.
17
Gamer Buys Virtual Space Station, BBC News, Oct. 25, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/4374610.stm.
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players,18 while other sales are made by the game company itself.19 Yet
other sales are made by gaming sweatshops that pay workers, often in
poor countries, to play online games for eighty or more hours per week.20
In playing the games, the sweatshop workers create powerful characters
and collect virtual property. The sweatshop owners then sell this virtual
property on the open market.21 In all of these sales, a player spends real
money to purchase virtual property in order to gain prestige or competitive
advantage in the game or simply to have more fun playing.22
[5] What, however, are purchasers of virtual property getting for their
money? Consider the purchase of the virtual space station for $100,000.
What would happen if the computer went down, the game company went
out of business, the land map was upgraded (i.e., the game was changed in
a way that deleted the virtual space station), the game was reset, or there
was a bug, hack, or glitch in the system that caused the virtual property to
be lost or rendered worthless? Are there, or should there be, default rules
to govern virtual property? This paper will examine these questions.
Section I describes various kinds of virtual property. Section II discusses
the uncertain default rules for the protection of virtual property. Section
III explores how virtual property should be conceptualized. Section IV
proposes default legal rules for virtual property that are based on the
realities of the underlying technology and the reasonable expectations of
game players and game companies.
[6] It should be noted that the discussion herein of the legal rights and
duties related to virtual property draws from the “seamless web of law,”23
18

Though perhaps not a “regular” game player, writer Julian Dibbell spent one year as a
real-money businessman in the game Ulitma Online. See Daniel Terdiman, Virtual
Trader Barely Misses Goal, WIRED, Apr. 16, 2004, available at
http://www.wired.com/news/games/0,2101,63083,00.html.
19
See Wikipedia, supra note 5 (search “Entropia Universe”).
20
David Barboza, Ogre to Slay? Outsource It To Chinese, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2005,
available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/09/technology/09gaming.html?ex=1291784400&en=a
723d0f8592dff2e&ei=5090. According to the article, the workers get paid less than $1
per hour and play games 12 hours per day 7 days per week.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Thomas Ross, Metaphor and Paradox, 23 GA. L. REV. 1053, 1053 (1989).
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and the theories that explain and expand that web. This paper draws from
what those areas of law termed “property law” and “contract law.” The
terminology in this paper, however, is drawn less from the broad expanse
of the “seamless web of life”24 from the realm of physical property (e.g.,
“owning” or “destroying” virtual property). Although discussion of
virtual property lends itself to the use of physical property terms, this does
not mean that the rights discussed herein should necessarily be considered
property rights. Notwithstanding, as noted by Thomas Grey, property law
has moved from a discussion of “things that are owned by persons” to a
fragmentation of property rights into “bundle[s] of rights” and an
“eliminat[ion of] any necessary connection between property rights and
things.”25 The rights and duties discussed and proposed herein might be
more appropriately categorized as contractual duties between the game
companies and game players than property laws relating the game
companies and game players to virtual property. Little may turn, however,
on how virtual property rights are classified. Given that the law is a
seamless web, and is not always easily delineated along the lines of
property and contract, a court might rely directly or analogically on
property law, contract law, or other areas of law to address the issues that
will arise with respect to virtual property.
II. VIRTUAL PROPERTY
[7] There are many computer programs that could be considered virtual
environments. Not all of these will lead to the creation of virtual property,
at least not the type that is discussed herein. First consider creation
software. For example, with Form Z, an architectural design program, one
can design buildings.26 With AutoCAD, a computer-aided design
program, one can design engines, machines, and other devices.27 With
24

Frederick Schauer, 1985 Survey of Books Relating to the Law: VIII. Legal Practice and
Profession, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1141, 1141 (1985).
25
THOMAS C. GREY, Disintegration of Property, in PROPERTY: NOMOS XXII 69-85 (J.
Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman, eds., 1980), reprinted in A PROPERTY
ANTHOLOGY 534-42, 534 (Richard H. Chused, ed. 1997).
26
See Form Z Products, http://www.formz.com/Products.html (last visited Dec. 18,
2006).
27
See AutoCAD,
http://usa.autodesk.com/adsk/servlet/index?siteID=123112&id=2704278 (last visited
Dec. 18, 2006).
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Adobe Photoshop, one can create 2D images.28 With Microsoft Word, one
can create documents and stories.29 Each of these programs allows users
to create property that is represented electronically. The items created are
covered by well understood laws, for example a copyright can protect a
building design.30 The machines made in AutoCAD can be protected with
patents.31 The images made in Adobe Photoshop can be protected with
trademark or copyright.32 The documents written in Microsoft Word can
be protected by copyright,33 or a more limited license.34 Given that these
items are represented electronically, one might consider these forms of
electronically represented property as “virtual property” although these
will not be treated in this paper.
[8] A second type of virtual property, that which will be considered in this
paper, is anything that is “owned” in a multi-user online game. This can
include character accounts and in-game assets such as virtual currency,
virtual weapons, and virtual real estate.35 Though this type of virtual
property exists whether or not the player attaches any value to the
property, the discussion in this paper will focus on those situations in
which the virtual property is valued by the player. The reason for this
focus is that issues of rights to virtual property are likely to arise only if
the player values it. The most common indication that virtual property is
valued is that a market for virtual property develops.

28

See Adobe Photoshop, http://www.adobe.com/products/photoshop/main.html (last
visited Dec. 18, 2006).
29
See Microsoft Office Online Homepage, http://office.microsoft.com/en-us/default.aspx
(last visited Dec. 18, 2006).
30
See Rashida Y.V. MacMurray, Trademarks or Copyrights: Which Intellectual Property
Right Affords its Owner the Greatest Protection of Architectural Ingenuity?, 3 NW. J.
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 111, 2 (Spring 2005).
31
See General Information Concerning Patents,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/doc/general/index.html (last visited Dec. 18,
2006).
32
See id.
33
See id.
34
See Creative Commons: Choosing a License,
http://creativecommons.org/about/licenses (last visited Dec. 18, 2006).
35
See Mark Wallace, The Game is Virtual. The Profit is Real., N.Y. TIMES, May 29,
2005, available at 2005 WL 8515571.
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[9] A market for virtual property is likely to arise only if the virtual
environment (or game) is persistent and multi-user and the virtual property
is persistent and non-replicable. In order for virtual property to be
persistent, the game must be persistent. When a person plays a nonpersistent, multi-user game such as ID Software’s Quake series,36 she may
find a virtual gun in the game. The weapon is no doubt valuable within
the game as it allows the player to perform the object of the game—
shooting other players. When the game ends or is restarted, however, the
player restarts play without the virtual gun. The weapon’s lack of
persistence results in the lack of a market for any particular instance of the
virtual gun.37 Whether or not the ownership of the ephemeral virtual gun
should be protected by law is unlikely to be litigated. A player’s loss of a
virtual gun in Quake due to an error in the game, for example, will be of
limited importance once the game has restarted. Though this paper will
deal with the case in which ownership of virtual property is persistent, the
discussion herein may also be applicable to situations in which the virtual
property is ephemeral, as in the Quake example.
[10] A game must typically be multi-user in order for a market for virtual
property to form. Yet, there are single-user games in which virtual
property exists. In many console games, such as Rockstar Games’ Vice
City, 38 items collected in the game can be stored for long periods of time
on memory cards in the game console. The player may find a virtual car
or weapon in the game. The ownership of this virtual property is stored
but, since the game is single-user, the virtual property cannot be sold
among players.39 Though the ideas in this paper might be applicable to
36

See ID Software: Quake, http://www.idsoftware.com/games/quake/quake (last visited
Dec. 18, 2006).
37
Whereas one could imagine players paying some amount each time the game is
restarted in order to start the particular session of the game in possession of the virtual
gun, it would be hard to believe a market would form based on player X finding the
virtual weapon and selling it to player Y before the particular session of the game ends,
which will often be after tens of minutes. Quake II: Capture the Flag User Manual,
http://q2ctf.com/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2006) (stating that “the default is a twenty minute
match”).
38
See Rockstar Games: Grand Theft Auto Vice City,
http://www.rockstargames.com/vicecity (last visited Dec. 18, 2006).
39
One could, however, sell the memory card on which the ownership and character
information is stored. I have never found such sales.
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such types of virtual property, the discussion will be limited to those
scenarios in which virtual property is alienable or assignable among
players’ characters within the game, as transactions around such items
represent much of the market for virtual property.
[11] Markets will typically form only if the virtual property is nonreplicable. Consider, for example, a virtual sword in a persistent, multiuser game. If the sword is particularly powerful, then other users will
want to obtain the sword from the owner. If the other players were, for
example, able to “right-click” their cursors over the virtual sword and
select “make me a copy of the sword,” thereby making a copy of the
sword for free, then no one would buy the sword from the original owner.
On the other hand, if the virtual sword is not freely replicable then a
market might form for the sword.40 Markets around non-replicable virtual
property have formed in World of Warcraft and other games.41 A virtual
property market may form where: games provide for alienation of virtual
property, the virtual property persists over time, there are multiple users
available to create a market for the property, and the virtual property is not
freely replicable. The issues surrounding such virtual property are the
focus of this paper.
III. THE UNCERTAIN DEFAULT RULES FOR VIRTUAL PROPERTY
A. VIRTUAL PROPERTY AND END-USER LICENSE AGREEMENTS

40

Strictly speaking, markets should form if the virtual property is not freely replicable,
unlike the sword described in the example above. If property is replicable in a controlled
manner, then a market may still be created around it. For example, if the owner of the
virtual sword in the example could keep ten copies of the sword in circulation, then the
virtual sword would be “replicable,” but a market could form around the alienation of the
ten copies of the sword.
41
For example, as this was being written, a virtual sword for sale on eBay had been bid
up to $50. See supra note 14. See generally Musgrove, supra note 11 (describing the
real-world economy created by online role-playing games).
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[12] Users of online games typically sign End-User License Agreements
(“EULAs”) in order to gain access to the games.42 EULAs often deny
players any ownership interest in virtual property and allow for arbitrary
termination of players’ accounts. For example, the EULA of Project
Entropia has an ownership clause by which game players forego all rights
to virtual property43 and a termination clause that allows MindArk to
terminate a character’s account arbitrarily.44 The EULA for World of
Warcraft has similarly harsh ownership and termination clauses.45
[13] Consider the implications of the EULA in the recent $100,000 virtual
real estate sale in the game Project Entropia. The maker of Project
42

Jack M. Balkin, Law and Liberty in Virtual Worlds, 1 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 63, 64-65
(2004-2005).
43
Entropia Universe: Apply for Account, supra note 10, at § 7 (stating that “all virtual
items are part of the System and MindArk retains all rights, title, and interest in all parts
including, but not limited to Avatars and Virtual Items; these retained rights include,
without limitation, patent, copyright, trademark, trade secret and other proprietary rights
throughout the world. As part of your interactions with the System, you may acquire,
create, design, or modify Virtual Items, but you agree that you will not gain any
ownership interest whatsoever in any Virtual Item, and you hereby assign to MindArk all
of your rights, title and interest in any such Virtual Item.”).
44
Entropia Universe: Apply for Account, supra note 10, at § 6, Account Inactivity and
Account Termination (stating that “MindArk may terminate this Agreement upon notice
to Participant. Such termination may be made without reason . . . .”).
45
Throughout this paper, Project Entropia and Mr. Jacobs are used as examples. As
noted above, the EULA for Project Entropia is representative of the EULAs for at least
some other online games. Compare, for example, the termination and virtual property
clauses of the World of Warcraft. Blizzard Entertainment, the maker of World of
Warcraft, “reserves the right to terminate this Agreement without notice, if, in Blizzard
Entertainments sole and absolute discretion, you fail to comply with any terms contained
in these Terms of Use or the World of Warcraft EULA.” World of Warcraft: Terms of
Use, https://signup.worldofwarcraft.com/agreement.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2006).
Read literally, this may effectively allow at will termination at will by Blizzard
Entertainment, given that its sole and absolute discretion may not be challenged.
Furthermore, the ownership clause for World of Warcraft reads: “[N]o one has the right
to ‘sell’ Blizzard Entertainments content, except Blizzard Entertainment! So Blizzard
Entertainment does not recognize any property claims outside of World of Warcraft or
the purported sale, gift or trade in the ‘real world’ of anything related to World of
Warcraft. Accordingly, you may not sell items for ‘real’ money or exchange items
outside of World of Warcraft.” World of Warcraft Terms of Use Agreement,
https://signup.worldofwarcraft.com/agreement.html. At a high level, this has the same
effect as Project Entropia’s ownership clause: eliminating any virtual property rights of
game players.

9

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XIII, Issue 2

Entropia, MindArk, sold a virtual space resort located in the “treacherous
but Mineral Rich Paradise V Asteroid Belt.”46 The space resort provides
the purchaser with 1,000 virtual apartment deeds, 100 virtual store deeds
in a virtual shopping mall, taxation rights, land management, event
management, marketing management systems, and a landing point for new
characters.47 The space resort was originally set for a $0.10 starting price
with a pre-auction buyout price of $100,000.48 Within a few days of the
announcement, the buyout price was met by Jon Jacobs, an independent
filmmaker whose character in Project Entropia is called “NeverDie.”49
[14] What did Mr. Jacobs purchase? According to the EULA, “MindArk
retains all rights, title, and interest in all parts including, but not limited to
[Characters] and Virtual Items . . . .” 50 The contract further reads:
As part of your interactions with [Project Entropia], you
may acquire, create, design, or modify Virtual Items, but
you agree that you will not gain any ownership interest
whatsoever in any Virtual Item, and you hereby assign to

46

Posting of Dan Hunter to Terra Nova,
http://terranova.blogs.com/terra_nova/2005/10/the_winner_and_.html (Oct. 25, 2005).
MindArk, the maker of Project Entropia, allows people to play its game for free and sells
in-game currency for real money. Once in the game, players can create wealth by killing
monsters and retrieving treasure from the corpses worth pennies or tens of cents. Some
of the treasures on the monsters’ corpses, however, are worth the equivalent of over
$1,000. See About: Hunting Guide, http://www.project-entropia.com/en/rich/5115.html
(last visited Oct. 17, 2006). The wealth that a player has in the game can be converted
into real-world currency for a 1.5% fee. See Withdrawals: Bank Withdrawal,
http://www.project-entropia.com/en/rich/5675.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2006); Screen
shot of Withdrawal (on file with author).
47
New arrivals, or “newbs,” can choose to start their experience in the virtual world of
Project Entropia at the space resort. The advantage for the space resort owner of hosting
new arrivals is that the new arrivals will invariably spend in-game money, thereby
increasing the wealth of the space station owner. Geoff Duncan, Psst! Buddy! Wanna
Buy a Space Station? DIGITAL TRENDS NEWS, Oct. 27, 2005,
http://news.digitaltrends.com/article8658.html.
48
Id.
49
Daniel Terdiman, Man Pays $100,000 for Virtual Resort, CNET NEWS.COM, Nov. 11,
2005, http://news.com.com/2102-1043_3-5945248.html?tag=st.util.print.
50
Entropia Universe: Apply for Account, supra note 10, at § 7.
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MindArk all of your rights, title and interest in any such
Virtual Item.51
If MindArk retains all rights to all virtual items, including the space
station, then what did the company sell to Mr. Jacobs for $100,000? One
may argue that MindArk sold the right for Mr. Jacobs to “play space resort
owner.” However, he also purchased the right to sell the 1,000 virtual
apartment deeds and the 100 virtual store deeds for in-game currency.
Considering that in-game currency can be withdrawn from Project
Entropia from any real-world ATM machine in the form of real-world
currency, Mr. Jacobs can sell the deeds and convert the in-game proceeds
into real-world money—all within the limits of the EULA.52 If he can sell
the property, effectively for real-world money, then does he own
something more than the right to play space station owner? Did Mr.
Jacobs gain an ownership interest, at least in the alienable deeds, that is
arguably contrary to the EULA?
[15] Perhaps, notwithstanding the language of the EULA, MindArk is
selling some right in the virtual real estate to Mr. Jacobs. The website on
which the auction was hosted clearly states that the “ownership interest” in
that virtual space station includes 1,000 apartment deeds, 100 shop deeds,
and other virtual property.53 If the assignment of all virtual property rights
to MindArk in the EULA controls the interpretation of any “ownership
interest” listed in the offer, or if the represented “ownership interests”
were merely rights to play certain aspects of the game in the first instance,
then the question remains: what did Mr. Jacobs buy? Consider also that
the EULA states that MindArk can terminate Mr. Jacobs’ account at any
time for no reason.54 According to the EULA, he owns merely a right to
play “space station owner” but little else, and even that right can be taken
away without cause. Can the rights transferred really be so ephemeral?
51

Id.
See Seth Schiesel, An Online Game’s Economy Yields A.T.M. Dollars, N.Y. TIMES,
May 2, 2006, at E1. See also Entropia Universe: Withdrawals: Entropia Universe Cash
Card, http://www.project-entropia.com/en/rich/5676.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2006).
53
See Duncan, supra note 47.
54
Entropia Universe: Apply for Account, supra note 10, at § 6 (“MindArk may terminate
this Agreement upon notice to Participant. Such termination may be made without
reason . . . .”).
52
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[16] Perhaps, since the EULA had already been signed at the time the
offer was made, a court would interpret the offer (insomuch as its terms
conflicted with the EULA) as superseding the terms of the EULA.55 If
this were the case, then the ownership interest of Mr. Jacobs might be less
ephemeral. The offer for sale, under the heading of “ownership rights,”
offered, among other things, 1,000 “Apartment Deeds” and a “[s]pawning
point for newcomers to Project Entropia [, which] will enable the owner to
market his Space station Resort outside Project Entropia so that the
newcomers will arrive directly at the resort . . . .”56 These terms of this
offer may be in conflict with the EULA. It is possible to read the
ownership interest in the 1,000 apartment deeds as implying a right to sell
the deeds to other players. The sale of the ownership interest in the deeds
to Mr. Jacobs could indicate that he has the right to retain his account, or
at least the ability to sell the deeds, thereby at least partially overriding the
termination and ownership clauses of the EULA.
[17] The “spawning point” term in the offer for sale may also, at least
partially, override the clauses of the EULA. The term implies that the
owner should be able to market his space station to new players, which
implies that he will have a continuing ownership right. If he has a right to
market the space station over time, then a court might find Mr. Jacobs has
a right to continue playing the game, or otherwise maintain pecuniary
control over the space station in opposition to the termination and
ownership clauses.
[18] Moreover, a court might find that the plain meaning of the terms of
the offer overrides the EULA’s ownership clause. The EULA states that
the players of the game cannot “own” any virtual item;57 however, the
offer clearly includes “ownership rights.”58 Mr. Jacobs may “own” the
space station and the related virtual property contrary to the terms of the
ownership clause. The question remains, however, if Mr. Jacobs “owns”
55

See Howard University. v. Good Food Servs., Inc., 608 A.2d 116, 127, n. 8 (D.C. Cir.
1992).
56
Posting by Mike Sellers to Tetra Nova,
http://terranova.blogs.com/terra_nova/2005/10/the_winner_and_.html (last visited Dec.
18, 2006). Sellers quotes language from the original offer to sell.
57
Entropia Universe: Apply for Account, supra note 10, at § 7.
58
Duncan, supra note 47.
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something, then what exactly are his rights? I address that question in the
discussion of the conceptualization and protection of bits in context.
B. ENFORCEABILITY OF END-USER LICENSE AGREEMENTS
[19] Gregory Lastowka and Dan Hunter believe that more cases
surrounding virtual property rights will go to court notwithstanding the
restrictive EULAs.59 “Click-through” agreements, such as the EULAs in
the case of online games, are generally enforceable.60 The agreements
themselves, which are electronic for most online games, are considered
“writings” and, therefore, are enforceable under the Statute of Frauds.61 If
the terms are presented to the user and the user accepts the terms, perhaps
by pressing a button reading “I agree,” then the contract will generally be
held as enforceable.62 However, as noted in ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg,
shrinkwrap and click-through licenses may be unenforceable if they are
contrary to positive law or are unconscionable.63

59

Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, The Laws of the Virtual World, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1,
50-51 (2004). At least one such case was filed in the United States. “BlackSnow
Interactive, which runs the CamelotExchange Website, filed the suit . . . in the U.S. Court
for the Central District of California against Mythic Entertainment, developer of the
game ‘Dark Age of Camelot . . . .’” David Becker, Game Exchange Dispute Goes to
Court, CNET NEWS.COM, Apr. 7, 2002, http://news.com.com/2102-1040_3832347.html?tag=st.util.print. The case was eventually dismissed before trial. See
generally Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, Computer Law: Novel Legal Issues in
Virtual Property, 234 N.Y. L.J. 3 (2005).
60
See Moore v. Microsoft Corp., 741 N.Y.S.2d 91, 91 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002) (holding
that a user clicking an “I agree” button at the end of the EULA indicates the user’s assent
to the provider’s terms).
61
See In re RealNetworks, Inc., Privacy Litigation., No. 00 C 1366, 2000 WL 631341,
Section I. at *3-4. (N.D. Ill. May 8, 2000) (applying Washington law) (Not Reported in
F.Supp.2d).
62
Moore v. Microsoft Corp., 293 A.D, 741 N.Y.S.2d 587, 587 (2d Dep't 2002) (holding
that a user clicking an “I agree” button at the end of an EULA indicates the user’s assent
to the provider’s terms). 91.
63
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996). See also ProCD, Inc.
v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640, 650 (W.D. Wis. 1996) (overturnedrev’d on other
grounds by ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996)) (holding that a
shrinkwrap license takes the “place of any bargains or agreements between mass market
software producers and users, because the typical software transaction does not involve
bargained agreements concerning use limitations . . . .”).
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[20] The EULAs for online games do not appear to be contrary to positive
law.64 Whether the EULAs in online games, such as MindArk’s EULA
for Project Entropia,65 are unconscionable is debatable. Below is a
discussion of whether the EULA itself is unconscionable, looking
particularly at termination66 and ownership clauses.67 There is also
discussion of whether a sale of virtual property incorporating terms of the
EULA is unconscionable. This is followed by discussion of whether the
contracts (either the EULA itself or the sale of virtual property
incorporating terms of the EULA) should be reformed based on the
reasonable expectations of the game players, and whether there is an
implied duty on the part of the game company that would contravene the
termination and ownership clauses.
1. UNCONSCIONABILITY OF THE END-USER LICENSE AGREEMENT
[21] A finding of unconscionability can rest on procedural
unconscionability, substantive unconscionability, or both.68 Generally,
when addressing procedural unconscionability, courts consider the
likelihood that the adhering party has read and understood the terms,69 the
relative number of similar transactions in which each party has engaged,70
the relative bargaining power of the parties,71 and whether there was
64

This paper proposes default rules for game player rights with respect to virtual
property. One might propose legislation or the courts might adopt precedential positions
with respect to virtual property. Today, however, there does not appear to be any positive
law concerning game player rights with respect to virtual property.
65
Entropia Universe: Apply for Account, supra note 10.
66
Id. at § 6.
67
Id. at §§ 7-8.
68
Gillman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 534 N.E.2d 824, 828 (N.Y. 1988) (citations
omitted); Frank’s Maint. & Eng’g, Inc. v. C. A. Roberts Co., 408 N.E.2d 403, 409-10 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1980). See also Maxwell v. Fid. Fin. Servs., Inc., 907 P.2d 51, 58-59 (Ariz.
1995) (recognizing that either procedural or substantive unconscionability is sufficient);
Lewis Kornhauser, Unconscionability in Standard Forms, 64 CAL. L. REV. 1152, 115253 (1976) (stating that enforceability of a contract is determined by the process leading
up to the agreement).
69
See Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hosp., 133 Cal. Rptr. 775, 785 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976)
(citations omitted).
70
See Featherstone v. Merrill Lynch, Inc., 822 N.E.2d 841, 846 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004)
(citations omitted).
71
See Williams, 350 F.2d at 449.
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meaningful choice.72 These factors arguably weigh in favor of finding
procedural unconscionability for the EULAs. Whereas it may be
impossible to know if the game player read and understood all of the terms
of the contract,73 it is clear that the number of EULAs engaged in by game
players is smaller by an order of magnitude of 1,000 to 10,000 than the
number engaged in by game companies.74 There is no evidence, however,
and it is unlikely, that MindArk or any game companies have negotiated
or would negotiate with game players before they sign EULAs.75
Furthermore, whereas game players clearly have a choice among game
companies, since the terms of each game company’s EULA are similar,
that choice may be illusory.76 Additionally, although game players can

72

Courts have also held that procedural unconscionability may be “satisfied if the
agreement constitutes a contract of adhesion.” This results in a similar analysis. (Parilla
v. IAP Worldwide Servs. VI, Inc., 368 F.3d 269, 276-77 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981)).
73
Furthermore, “the general proposition that a person who signs a contract is bound by
all of its terms even though he signed it without reading it may not be given full sweep
where the contract is one of adhesion.” Wheeler, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 785 (citations
omitted). A contract of adhesion is defined as a “standardized contract . . . offered to
consumers of goods and services on essentially a take-it-or-leave-it basis without
affording the consumer a realistic opportunity to bargain . . . .” Id. at 783. On the other
hand, as noted by Leff, though the terms of a contract of adhesion may not have been
negotiated, this does not necessarily indicate that the contract should not be enforced.
Arthur Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 144 (1970). The EULA was
arguably signed with no realistic opportunity to bargain, and, therefore, may be a contract
of adhesion. As such, game players who sign the EULA might not be bound by all of its
terms. See Wheeler, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 785 (citations omitted).
74
Project Entropia, for example, has over 300,000 players and MindArk presumably
entered into an EULA with each of those players. Entropia Universe, supra note 3. See
also Entropia Universe: Apply for Account, supra note 10. World of Warcraft has over 5
million users worldwide. Press Release, Blizzard Entertainment, World of Warcraft
Surpasses Five Million Customers Worldwide (Dec. 19, 2005), available at
http://www.blizzard.com/press/051219.shtml.
75
As noted by Leff, the adhesion contract provides an opportunity for the consumer to
“flip the switch”: either enter into the contract provided by the drafting party or opt out of
the commercial transaction altogether. In such transactions very few of the individual
terms of the contract are open to bargaining. Leff, supra note 73, at 142-43.
76
Having multiple sellers offering similar or identical terms is tantamount to having no
meaningful choice. See Richard Craswell, Property Rules and Liability Rules in
Unconscionability and Related Doctrines, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 47 (1993).
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simply avoid playing these games, the ability to forego entering into a
contract does not necessarily overcome procedural unconscionability.77
[22] As noted by Margaret Radin however, courts are unlikely to
invalidate click-through contracts, such as the EULAs discussed herein, on
purely procedural unconscionability grounds.78 Instead, courts look to the
substance of the contract and invalidate only those whose terms are so
“onerous . . . [that] they are [unlikely] to be the result of buyer choice.”79
Finding such onerousness of contract terms is tantamount to finding
substantive unconscionability. As such, any finding of procedural
unconscionability of the EULAs would likely be based on a finding of
substantive unconscionability. Therefore, the discussion herein will focus
on an analysis of the substantive unconscionability of the EULAs.
[23] A court can find that a contract is substantively unconscionable when
the terms unduly favor one party80 or when the “disputed provision of the
contract falls outside the ‘reasonable expectations’ of the nondrafting
party . . . .”81 It is arguably the case for Project Entropia that the EULA
unduly favors MindArk. MindArk, if it so chooses, can arbitrarily
77

See generally Williams, 350 F.2d 445 (holding a contract for furniture purchase
unconscionable based in part on lack of meaningful choice where purchaser could have
opted not to purchase at all); Pardee Constr. Co. v. Super. Ct., 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 288 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2002) (holding a contract for home purchase unconscionable based in part on
lack of meaningful choice where buyers could have opted not to purchase at all).
Although purchasing a home or furniture may be more essential—or at least more
mainstream—than playing a game, courts should arguably not be biased against
contractees’ rights with respect to games as compared to contractees’ rights with respect
to more traditional agreements.
78
Margaret Jane Radin, Humans, Computers, and Binding Commitment, 75 IND. L.J.
1125, 1156 (2000).
79
Id. at 1149. Similarly, Craswell notes that onerous terms may indicate a lack of
consent. Craswell, supra note 76, at 41-42.
80
See John Deere Leasing Co. v. Blubaugh, 636 F.Supp. 1569, 1573 (D. Kan. 1986). See
also Sprague v. Household Int'l, No. 04-0106-CV-W-NKL, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11694, at *20 (W.D. Mo. June 15, 2005).
81
Gutierrez v. Autowest, Inc., 7 Cal. Rptr.3d 267, 275 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). See also C
& J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169, 177 (Iowa 1975); Craswell,
supra note 76, at 27 (noting that whereas the reasonable expectations doctrine was
originally applied to insurance contracts, it is increasingly being applied “to other
standard form contracts as well.”).
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undermine virtual property rights or terminate game players’ accounts, all
within the terms of the EULA.82 A court might find such facially onesided terms unduly favorable to MindArk.
[24] Additionally, as to the one-sided nature of a EULA, a court can also
consider whether there is a lack of business necessity for harsh terms in
the EULA,83 and the importance of the rights the drafter retains by
incorporating particular terms.84 MindArk might argue that it has a
business necessity to retain the right to terminate players or destroy virtual
property at will in order to maintain control of or otherwise sustain Project
Entropia. MindArk might also argue that it would not terminate player
accounts or destroy virtual property arbitrarily given counterincentives,
such as maintaining a good reputation among game players. Those
concerns about reputation, however, are not part of the contract and do not
negate the unduly one-sided nature of the contract or the lack of business
necessity for the terms. If MindArk does not need arbitrary termination
and ownership clauses, then a court might be left to ask: why include such
harsh clauses? A finding that there is no reason for the arbitrariness of the
clauses weighs in favor of finding the EULA, or at least the harsh clauses,
substantively unconscionable.
[25] Furthermore, the virtual property theory of bits in context described
below may provide a more reasonable distribution of the rights between
Mr. Jacobs and MindArk than the EULA for Project Entropia. That the
EULA is unnecessarily harsh or oppressive, and that there exist more
balanced theories or proposals for virtual property rights, supports a
finding that the restrictive terms of the EULA may be unenforceable as
unconscionable “in the light of the general commercial background and
the commercial needs of the particular trade or case.”85
[26] The terms of the EULA also arguably fall outside of the reasonable
expectations of game players and; therefore, favor a finding of substantive
82

Entropia Universe: Apply for Account, supra note 10, at §§ 6-8.
See Williams, 350 F.2d at 450 (citations omitted).
84
See Waters v. Min Ltd., 587 N.E.2d 231, 234 (Mass. 1992) (citing A. Corbin, Contracts
§ 128, at 551 (1963 & Supp. 1991)).
85
Williams, 350 F.2d at 450 (citations omitted).
83
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unconscionability. Whereas it might be difficult or impossible to fully
determine what would constitute reasonable expectations of game players,
a game player will reasonably expect that she will not be terminated
arbitrarily from a game and that her virtual property will not be arbitrarily
destroyed. For example, consider a game player who is part of Project
Entropia’s population of over 300,000 players. It is reasonable for her to
expect that she will not be terminated from the game arbitrarily and for no
cause while the other 300,000 players continue to play the game. Such an
arbitrary termination would be permissible under the current termination
clause.86 Similarly, a game player who owns a virtual sword of a
particular type will reasonably expect that, if other players who own the
same type of sword retain their virtual swords from one day to the next,
that she will also. Under the current terms of the EULA, however,
arbitrary and individual destruction of virtual property by MindArk would
be permissible.87 That the EULA would allow MindArk to take actions
that are arguably outside of the reasonable expectations of the game
players, both with respect to termination of players’ accounts and with
respect to virtual property, favors a finding that the terms are substantively
unconscionable. Based on the arguments above, a court could find that at
least these termination and ownership clauses are substantively
unconscionable and, therefore, that at least these terms of the EULA are
unenforceable.88
2. UNCONSCIONABILITY OF THE SALE
[27] There are colorable arguments for the unconscionability of EULAs
that allow for arbitrary game-player account termination and require game
players to surrender all rights to virtual property. A contract for the sale of
virtual property by a game company, such as MindArk’s sale of the space
station to Mr. Jacobs, might also be unconscionable. If the sale of virtual
property grants rights to the virtual property in a manner that overrides the
terms of the EULA, then the arguments made above for the
unconscionability of the EULA would not apply. There would still be,
however, a question as to what rights the player has gained with respect to
86

Entropia Universe: Apply for Account, supra note 10, at § 6.
Id. at §§ 7-8.
88
See ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1449.
87
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the purchased virtual property. This is discussed below with respect to the
proposed default right to bits in context.
[28] If, on the other hand, the sale of virtual property were interpreted to
incorporate the ownership and termination clauses of the EULA, then the
case for finding unconscionability would be stronger than for the EULA
alone.89 A sale incorporating the termination and ownership clauses
would be even more favorable to MindArk than the EULA itself. For
example, MindArk would be able to sell the space station to Mr. Jacobs,
terminate his account the next day for any reason, and resell the space
station to another user. Furthermore, MindArk’s ability to sell virtual
property, combined with the ability to terminate accounts at will, might
result in undesirable, but rational, behavior. If MindArk felt that it would
receive a net benefit by terminating Mr. Jacobs’ account and reselling the
space station (for example, if Mr. Jacobs or his character were particularly
disliked in the Project Entropia community), notwithstanding concerns
about reputation, then it might rationally do so after the sale—all within
the terms of the EULA.90 Clearly, given the preposterous liberty such a
one-sided sale would provide MindArk, the terms of the sale incorporating
the terms of the EULA are unduly favorable to MindArk, and thus
arguably unconscionable.

89

If, in a particular instance or litigated case, a sale of virtual property were found to
incorporate the termination and ownership clauses of the EULA and, therefore, to be
unconscionable and unenforceable as discussed below, then in future sales a game
company would likely incorporate wording that would clarify that the contract for sale of
virtual property did not incorporate the harsh terms of the EULA. In the future sales,
which would arguably grant virtual property rights, there would remain a question as to
what rights were granted.
90
Getting rid of an unpopular character may be seen in the virtual society of Project
Entropia as a net positive action, notwithstanding the unpopular player’s loss of virtual
property. That is, the damage done to MindArk’s reputation by destroying virtual
property might be outweighed by the benefit afforded to its reputation by
excommunicating the unpopular player. The destruction of virtual property in that case
might have no negative real-world economic repercussions for MindArk. If this were the
case, MindArk would have incentive to terminate Mr. Jacobs’ account: it would get rid of
an unpopular character, NeverDie, and it would allow them to resell the virtual space
station, presumably for another $100,000.
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[29] If a court did find the EULA itself, or the offer for sale interpreted as
incorporating the harsh terms of the EULA, to be unconscionable, and Mr.
Jacobs was bestowed some right with respect to the virtual property, then
the question would remain: What are his rights? I attempt to address this
below with the proposed default right to bits in context.
3. REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS
[30] Perhaps analyzing the conscionability of the EULA and the sale of
virtual property incorporating the terms of the EULA goes beyond what is
needed. As has been seen primarily in the insurance context, courts can
look to the “reasonable expectations” of contractees to decide whether
particular provisions of a contract should be enforced.91 When a game
company sells a virtual item to a game player, as when Mr. Jacobs
purchased the $100,000 virtual space station from MindArk, reasonable
parties would expect that the terms in the offer for sale that apparently
grant rights to virtual property would override the harsh terms of the
EULA.92
[31] Even if a court found that the sale incorporated the terms of the
EULA, however, a court might still find that the incorporated terms of the
EULA do not meet the reasonable expectations of the game player. To
assess reasonable expectations, the court determines whether the game
player was specially informed of “important, but obscure,” terms, whether
the terms were generally known by game players, and whether the contract
was ambiguous.93 If the terms do not meet reasonable expectations of
game players, then the court can replace the harsh terms with what it
believes is “objectively reasonable.”94 In Mr. Jacobs’ case, he was not
given notice of the harsh terms, given that the wording of the offer for sale
of the space station apparently overrode the harsh terms; there was
91

Craswell, supra note 76, at 27-29 (citations omitted). See generally Robert E. Keeton,
Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L. REV. 961 (1970).
92
See supra notes 55 to 56 and accompanying text.
93
Atwater Creamery Co. v. Western Nat. Mut. Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d 271, 278 (Minn.
1985).
94
Keeton, supra note 91, at 967, 974. Accord Perrine v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America,
56 N.J. 120, 127 (N.J. 1970). See also Craswell, supra note 76, at 14. See also Radin,
supra note 78, at 1156.
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ambiguity in the sale, given the apparent contradiction between the
wording of the offer and the terms of the EULA; and a reasonable player
would not assume that such harsh terms were in the contract. If the harsh
terms incorporated into the sale were replaced with terms that were
objectively reasonable, however, there would still be a question as to what
rights game players would be afforded.
[32] When considering the EULA itself, and not a sale incorporating the
terms of the EULA, a court might find that the EULA’s termination and
ownership clauses fall outside the reasonable expectations of game players
and therefore should be replaced with clauses that are objectively
reasonable – although the case may not be as strong as for the sale
incorporating the harsh terms. A game player, when signing up for a
game, might expect that her account would only be terminated for good
cause and that her virtual property would not arbitrarily disappear,
notwithstanding that the EULA indicates otherwise. Although the
language of the termination and ownership clauses of the EULA are
clear,95 the terms are arguably outside the general knowledge or
expectations of the game players96 and have not been specifically pointed
out to game players. 97 Therefore, a court could find the terms to be
outside the reasonable expectations of game players and replace the
offending terms with objectively reasonable terms.98 The question
remains, however, what terms would be objectively reasonable? A
proposal for such rights is presented in the discussion of bits in context.

95

Project Entropia’s EULA appears on the first page a player accesses when applying for
an account. See Project Entropia, Apply for an Account, supra note 10.
96
See supra notes 86-88.
97
The terms are included in the EULA, but the mere inclusion of terms in a contract is
not always sufficient to overcome the reasonable expectations of contractees. Atwater
Creamery Co., 366 N.W.2d at 278-79 (holding that a non-standard, non-ambiguous
burglary definition in an insurance contract did not meet the reasonable expectations of
the insured in part because the definition was not separately discussed or pointed out to
the insured).
98
See supra note 94.
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4. IS THERE AN IMPLIED DUTY?
[33] One might be tempted to bind a game player to the terms of the
EULA since she had an opportunity to view the harsh terms. As has been
seen in other commercial transactions, however, purchasers do not always
bear all the risk in transactions, even in contravention of terms set forth by
the seller. The warranty of merchantability, for example, was developed
to place some burden for the quality of goods on sellers, 99 regardless of
whether there was an absence of related terms in the contract or in
contravention of the terms of the contract.100
[34] The warranty of merchantability, which deals with the quality of
goods, might not apply directly in the case of the rights of game players to
virtual property, since the duties in question arguably relate to services and
not products. There are parallels, however. The implied warranty of
merchantability provides reasonable rights for purchasers. If one adopts
the objectively reasonable expectations of a game player (e.g., that a game
player is purchasing a contractual right to continue playing a game, unless
there is a good cause for termination, and to continue having reasonable
continuity of access to virtual property within the game) as the standard to
which the game companies should be held, then a game company would
breach the implied duty by arbitrarily terminating the account or
destroying virtual property, which would be permitted under the EULA.
A parallel to the implied warranty of merchantability would provide game
players with some implied rights with respect to termination and virtual
property that contravene the harsh terms of the EULA. The rights that
might be implied are addressed below with respect to bits in context.

99

Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 630 (Wash. 1913) (holding that a
manufacturer of food products has an implied warranty of merchantability where no
express warranty was given). See also U.C.C. § 2-314 (stating that merchants are
generally held to implied warranty as to the fitness and quality of merchandise sold).
100
See U.C.C. § 2-316 (stating that a warranty of merchantability is implied, regardless of
the terms of the contract, unless there is “conspicuous” wording to the contrary).
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C. COPYRIGHT
[35] Mia Garlick and Molly Stephens have discussed the issue of virtual
property rights in the context of game companies attempting to preclude
sales of virtual property. Both have concluded that copyright law cannot
be used by game companies to stop users from selling virtual property.
Garlick argues that neither the copyright doctrine of “substantial
similarity” nor the copyright doctrine of “infringement of derivative
works” should enable game companies to exclude game players from
selling in-game items101 and that courts should consider with more weight
the creative contribution of the gamers.102
[36] Stephens notes that none of the copyright doctrines of protection
against making copies, making derivative works, selling copies,
performing publicly, and displaying publicly should allow game
companies to preclude users from selling in-game items.103 Stephens
further argues that no part of intellectual property law, including
copyright, is likely to afford protection to game players for their in-game
assets.104
[37] The analysis of Garlick and Stephens may indicate that copyright law
is unable to preclude game players from obtaining some rights to virtual
property. That is, based on the analysis of Garlick and Stephens, MindArk
cannot rely on copyright law to deny Mr. Jacobs all rights with respect to
virtual property.

101

Mia Garlick, Player, Pirate or Conducer? A Consideration of the Rights of Online
Gamers, 7 YALE J. OF L. & TECH. 1, 28-29 (Spring 2004-2005).
102
Id. at 41.
103
See generally, Molly Stephens, Note, Sales of In-Game Assets: An Illustration of the
Continuing Failure of Intellectual Property Law to Protect Digital-Content Creators, 80
TEX. L. REV. 1513 (2002).
104
Id. at 1530-1531, 1532 (arguing, however, that a game player may have a right to her
character, but not to the assets it carries. She argues that game players may be able to
rely on unfair competition doctrine to protect some aspects of their in-game characters).
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IV. CONCEPTUALIZING VIRTUAL PROPERTY
[38] Assuming that the threshold issue of whether game players have
rights with respect to virtual property is resolved affirmatively, the
question remains: what should be protected? That is, presuming that the
EULAs (or copyright, etc.) do not preclude rights to virtual property, there
is still a question as to how rights should be apportioned between game
players and game companies. In order to address this issue, it is important
to properly conceptualize the rights bestowed upon game players with
respect to the virtual property that they own in games. Improper
conceptualization of the default rights of game players could cause
improper rulings or faulty or unduly complicated protection of players’
rights. Below, I reject a few conceptualizations of the rights to virtual
property: Epstein’s cybertrespass theory, protection of the integer as a
numeric concept, and protection of the database on which the bits
representing the virtual property reside. The rejections of these ideas are
followed by a discussion of conceptualizing rights to virtual property as
bits in context.
[39] Online games are typically built using client programs (clients) and
server programs (servers). The clients reside and run on the game players’
computers. The servers run on the game provider’s server. Each client
communicates electronically with a single server or with multiple servers
acting as a single server.105 The functionality of a client typically includes
rendering the graphics for the game player’s view. The server typically
stores information about the shared aspects of the virtual world in which
the game players’ characters reside. Other information related to
particular user accounts might be stored on the server or the client.
Decisions as to where to store particular information or data related to
characters and game play is usually based on server and client computing

105

Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute, Client/Server Software
Architectures--An Overview,
http://www.sei.cmu.edu/str/descriptions/clientserver_body.html (last visited Dec. 18,
20006). See also Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute, Three Tier
Architecture, http://www.sei.cmu.edu/str/descriptions/threetier.html#34492 and
Transaction Processing Monitor Technology,
http://www.sei.cmu.edu/str/descriptions/tpmt.html.
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resource availability and on reducing the bandwidth needed to transfer
information between the client and server.106
A. EPSTEIN’S CYBERTRESPASS THEORY
[40] Richard Epstein, in his cybertrespass theory, proffers that the law
should protect real-world chattels (computers) on which the in-game
elements reside.107 In a strict construction, this would tie rights in virtual
property to the physical computer or server on which the electronic
representation of the virtual property resides. For example, in a case
where a game player’s in-game inventory includes a virtual sword,
represented by an integer on the game company’s server,108 the strict
construction of the cybertrespass theory would provide the game company
protection for the computer server on which the integer representing the
virtual sword resides. No protection would be afforded to the game user.
If, on the other hand, information about the virtual sword was held within
a client program residing on the game player’s computer,109 then the game
player would have protection for the virtual property and the game
company would not have protection. This strict construction would hinge
rights to virtual property on the game company’s decision of where to
store data related to the virtual property.

106

Id.
See generally Richard Epstein, Cybertrespass, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 73 (Winter 2003).
108
For simplicity we are assuming that these virtual items are represented as integers and
are stored in databases. In general, they may be represented as floating point numbers,
complex data structures, raw bits, or any other electronic representation. Furthermore,
whereas it is likely that most game companies use databases to store the integer or other
electronic representation of the virtual property, the bits-in-context theory is not limited
to database representations. This theory applies equally to other storage mechanisms,
such as flat file or file/folder hierarchies. It is also herein presented that the bits will
reside on the game provider’s computer server. The theory, however, applies equally
regardless of where the bits are stored. The bits may be stored on the game player’s
computer or may be distributed between the client and server. See infra notes 111 to 114.
The program running the game on the server will interpret the integer as representing the
virtual property of a particular user. That is, the program creates the context in which the
server can interpret the integer to be the user’s virtual property.
109
Client/Server Software Architectures, supra note 105.
107
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[41] In some systems of clients and servers, information is replicated
between the client and server.110 In such cases, more complex algorithms
are needed to ensure that the data between the two remains synchronized.
For example, one of the two data sources would be considered dominant
and editable, and the other source considered a local cache or copy of the
data, which cannot be edited.111 The cybertrespass theory might accord
rights to one or both copies of the data. If the rights are split then, as
described below, it is not clear how the two sets of rights would be
apportioned. On the other hand, if the rights are not split, but instead are
given to the owner of the chattel on which the dominant and editable copy
of the data resides, then other problems may arise. In some systems, the
designation of which copy of the data is dominant and editable shifts over
time.112 That is, the dominant, editable copy of the data could be on either
the server computer or the client computer at any given moment. To
further complicate the matter, with more complex data, the first portion of
the data could be editable on the server computer and a second portion
could be editable on the client computer.113 It would be unclear who had
virtual property protection under the cybertrespass theory, given the
division of control.114 As this abbreviated discussion of distributed system
theory illustrates, depending on how a game is designed and where data
related to characters is stored, drastically different legal rights could
emerge under the cybertrespass theory. Given that the game player should
receive the same rights regardless of where the data resides, the strict
110

Microsoft Development Network, Replicating Data Between a Server and Clients,
http://msdn2.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms151787.aspx (last visited Dec. 18, 2006).
111
See, e.g., Alan Fekete et al., Eventually Serializable Data Services, PROCEEDINGS OF
THE FIFTEENTH ANNUAL ACM SYMPOSIUM ON PRINCIPLES OF DISTRIBUTED COMPUTING
300 (ACM Press 1996), available at
http://citeseer.csail.mit.edu/fekete96eventuallyserializable.html (last visited Dec. 18,
2006).
112
See, e.g., Kai Shen et al., Neptune: Scalable Replication Management and
Programming Support for Cluster-Based Network Services, PROCEEDINGS OF 3RD
USENIX SYMPOSIUM ON INTERNET TECHNOLOGIES AND SYSTEMS 197 (2001), available
at http://www.usenix.org/events/usits01/full_papers/shen/shen_html (last visited Dec. 18,
2006).
113
Stijn Dekeyser, Towards a New Approach to Tightly Coupled Document
Collaboration, PROCEEDINGS OF THE NINTH AUSTRALASIAN DOCUMENT COMPUTING
SYMPOSIUM (2004), available at http://www.cs.mu.oz.au/~alistair/adcs2004/
papers/paper10.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2006).
114
Client/Server Software Architectures, supra note 105.
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construction of the cybertrespass theory is clearly not the desired
conceptualization for virtual property rights.
[42] Perhaps, however, the cybertrespass theorist would argue for a
broader construction: providing shared rights in the part of the computer
disk on which the important bits reside between the owner of the server
(the game company) and the game player. This would circumvent some
of the overly complex rights-determination circumstances arising from the
distributed nature of the online games and would allow apportioning of the
rights to virtual property between the game provider and the game player.
It is not for the portion of the computer disk, however, that the game
player wants protection.
Under this broad construction of the
cybertrespass theory, absurd circumstances could arise. A game provider
could leave intact a file server to which a user’s rights are attached and use
a different file server for the game, thereby effectively disregarding any
useful virtual property rights; or a game provider could change the game
so that the bits on the protected portion of the server are useless or unused
– again disregarding any useful virtual property rights.
[43] Consider an example where a game player’s character “owns” one
million in game currency (GC). The one million GC are represented as an
integer on one of the game provider’s disk drives. Under the broad
reading of the cybertrespass theory, the game player would have some
right to the portion of the file server on which the integer representing the
one million GC is stored. The game company could not legally delete the
integer but could alter or destroy the usefulness of the integer by changing
the way in which currency is handled in the game and ignoring the integer.
This would effectively destroy any rights the game player would want
protected. The game player wants rights to the functionality associated
with the one million GC, not the portion of the disk on which the one
million GC are represented.
B. THERE SHOULD BE NO PROTECTION FOR THE INTEGER AS A NUMERIC
CONCEPT
[44] Courts should not base protection of virtual property on the integer
representing the virtual property that resides in the game company’s
27
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database. The user does not have a right to that integer outside of the
context of the game or outside of the context of the user’s account for that
game.115 Furthermore, even within the context of the game, another user
may have the same virtual sword and therefore have protection for an
equal integer stored elsewhere in the game’s database. The user should be
afforded no protection for that number outside the context of the user’s
account within the game.
[45] If the game company changed or upgraded the game, then it might
alter the underlying representation of the virtual property. 116 Clearly, a
right to virtual property should not follow the old representation – the old
integer. If it did, then neither the interests of the game player nor the
interests of the game provider would be met. A “loss of virtual property”
would be caused by changing the underlying representation, even if the
game player retained all of her rights to use her virtual property within the
context of the game. A right that follows the new, changed representation
is appropriate. If the default right follows the new representation, then we
are closer to a conception of what is valuable to the game player – closer
to a conception of virtual property as bits in context.
C. PROTECTION SHOULD NOT BE ATTACHED TO THE DATABASE
CONTAINING THE INTEGER
[46] Virtual property protection should not be afforded to the portion of
the database in which the virtual property resides. A database is structured
data stored on a hard disk.117 It is conceivable to assign protection of
virtual property to the portion of the database storing the integer
115

If a virtual sword were represented by the integer forty-two, then the user would have
no right to the number forty-two outside of the context of the game. The user should
have no protection for the number forty-two as used in a business application, in another
game, or in any other context.
116
Underlying representations of virtual property might be changed in order to keep
virtual property consistent in the face of changing game code.
117
See Paragon Corporation, Databases: Past, Present, and Future, June 13, 2003,
http://www.paragoncorporation.com/ArticleDetail.aspx?ArticleID=20 (last visited Dec.
18, 2006) (explaining that “database” typically refers to the electronic representation of
data on a hard disk. A database server is the computer that controls access to the data in
the database).
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representing the virtual property.118 This would overcome some of the
problems associated with the cybertrespass theory insomuch as migration
of the database from one physical computer hard disk to another would not
cause a fragmenting or failure of the rights, because the database, as a unit,
would still exist on the server to which the database is migrated.
However, paralleling a problem with the cybertrespass theory, the
database could be maintained even if the game no longer used the
database. Such a circumstance would destroy the usefulness of the game
player’s virtual property while maintaining the database containing the
virtual property.
[47] Furthermore, in such a legal regime, a user’s enjoyment of virtual
property could continue even if the portion of the database in which the
integer representing the virtual property originally or previously resided
were destroyed. For example, if a game provider upgraded a game,
created a new database that included a representation for the virtual
property, and destroyed the old database that included the original
representation of the virtual property, then the game player would
continue to enjoy the virtual property notwithstanding the destruction of
the virtual property’s original representation within the original database.
Attaching rights associated with virtual property to the destroyed database
representation would create liability where there was no harm. Instead, it
would be more coherent to have the rights to virtual property attach first to
the original representation in the original database and later to the
subsequent representation in the upgraded database. This approaches the
suggested protection of bits within their context, as discussed next.
D. PROTECTION SHOULD BE FOR THE PARTICULAR INTEGER (BITS) AS USED
IN THE GAME (CONTEXT)
[48] In order to best protect the rights of game players with respect to
functionality of virtual property in the context of computer games, a
conceptualization of the rights of game players should be based on bits
118

The same argument applies to all electronic data sets. For example, in a flat file-based
system, protection should not be afforded to the part of the file that holds the integer
representing the virtual property. For a folder/file hierarchy, protection should not be
afforded to the file or part of a file within the hierarchy that stores the integer.
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(the integer represented electronically) in context (as used in the game). It
is within the context of a game that the bits have value, either objective or
subjective, and it is over bits representing virtual property as used in the
context of a game that issues of legal rights arise.
[49] One court case has already followed this construction. In China, a
user’s virtual property (the bits) in an online game (the context) was lost –
allegedly due to a hacker. Li Hongchen had spent years, and over one
thousand dollars, building up a virtual arsenal in Red Moon, a persistent,
online, multiuser game provided by Arctic Ice. One day he found that his
virtual arsenal was missing. Thus, the bits representing his virtual arsenal
were no longer accessible in the context of the game Red Moon. In the
court case that ensued, Li Hongchen v. Beijing Arctic Ice Technology
Development Co. in the Chaoyang District People's Court in Beijing, the
court found that the game provider, Arctic Ice, was negligent in allowing a
hacker to access and alter Li Hongchen’s account and alter the bits
representing the arsenal. The court ordered Arctic Ice to replace the
virtual property – to replace the bits so that they could be used in the
context of the game.119
[50] It does not matter that Arctic Ice, in replacing the virtual property,
might use different bits120 or that the replaced bits might be on a different
physical hard disk or in a different electronic database.121 The bits
representing the virtual property, as used in the context of the game, are
what held value for Li Hongchen. The bits in context provided him
functionality, and it was for those bits that he sought protection. A
construction of a default right to virtual property associated with the
numeric representation, the electronic database, or the physical server

119

David Canton, Theft Case Raises Questions, LONDON FREE PRESS (Can.), March 20,
2004, at C5.
120
If Arctic Ice had upgraded Red Moon, changing the underlying representation of
virtual property within the context of the game, then the bits used to replace the virtual
arsenal might have been different than those that were used before the hacker’s attack.
121
If Arctic Ice, from the time of the initial destruction of the virtual arsenal to the time
the bits were restored, had moved the game to a different physical server, then the case
would not be resolved by focusing on the portion of the old server on which the bits
resided.
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would at best provide an obscuring method of understanding the rights of
and the remedy for Li Hongchen.
[51] Conceptualizing the default right as bits in context should help courts
handle the subtle intricacies of individual cases coherently. Of course, the
default right of protecting bits in context cannot be absolute. The
following section discusses how the bits-in-context conceptualization of
rights to virtual property can provide a guideline for future cases, and how
existing doctrines can inform the protection of bits in context.
V. DEFAULT RIGHTS TO BITS IN CONTEXT
A. PROTECTION FROM DESTRUCTION AND DEVALUATION
[52] The default right for virtual property should protect bits in context
from destruction or theft – in certain circumstances. That is, virtual
property as represented by bits in the context of an online game should
generally be protected from actions which destroy the bits themselves
while the context, the game, continues. The case of Li Hongchen v.
Beijing Arctic Ice is an example of such protection. Li Hongchen’s virtual
property was protected from destruction caused by Arctic Ice’s
negligence.122 On the other hand, there may be circumstances in which
virtual property should not be protected from loss or theft. Consider, for
example, if a game company lost virtual property due to a natural disaster.
If a hurricane hit its computer center and caused the details of particular
virtual property to be unrecoverable, but did not cause so much damage
that the game was discontinued, then the game company arguably should
not be responsible for the lost virtual property. This begs the question:
when should virtual property be protected from loss or theft?
[53] Virtual property should also be protected from devaluation – in
certain circumstances. Suppose, for example, that a game company
introduces a set of virtual armor. A player determines a way to use the
armor to make her in-game character effectively invincible, thereby
making the armor very valuable. The invincibility is a problem for the
122

See supra note 120 and accompanying text.

31

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XIII, Issue 2

game company, which strives to keep a game “balanced.”123 The game
company arguably should be allowed to modify the game (the context of
the bits) to change the unbalanced aspects of the armor. Thus, the game
company should be able to change the virtual armor’s characteristics
within the game. Since balancing will typically weaken the armor, the
change is likely to devalue the armor. How much devaluation is too
much? When is devaluation justified?
[54] To address the scenarios of permissible and prohibited devaluation
and destruction (which is arguably a special case of devaluation) of virtual
property, I consider issues of grouping virtual property, permissible and
impermissible devaluation, and partial and total devaluation.
1. WHAT PRECISELY IS BEING DEVALUED?
[55] Before addressing prohibited destruction and devaluation, courts must
address whether or how virtual items should be grouped for consideration.
If the game player has a set of virtual armor comprising chest, arm, and
leg plates, then should the set of armor be considered together for
purposes of determining devaluation, or should each piece of armor be
considered separately? Should all of a player’s virtual property within a
game be grouped together when considering devaluation? If the game
player has a set of virtual armor worth $100 and a virtual sword worth
$200, then should one consider the devaluation of the $300 inventory or
the devaluation of the armor and sword separately?
[56] Grouping all virtual property together would create an undue bias
against those game players who own more virtual property. If a player
held only one piece of virtual property, then it would be protected from
destruction or total devaluation since that piece of virtual property would
be the inventory. However, if a devalued piece of virtual property were
part of a large, valuable inventory, then it might not be protected.
Completely devaluing the piece of virtual property would devalue the
inventory only slightly. Perhaps, instead, a decision of what to group for
123

“Balancing” a game refers to ensuring that no particular type of virtual property is
significantly more powerful than other alternatives and ensuring that no particular virtual
property provides one character or one type of character undue power.
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devaluation purposes could be based on whether the items could be found
or purchased separately or whether the items are generally purchased or
used together. Regardless of how virtual property is grouped, however,
one must consider when devaluation should be permitted.
2. PROHIBITING UNJUST DESTRUCTION AND DEVALUATION: LOOKING TO
THE DUTIES OF BAILEES AND THE “GOOD CAUSE” AND “GOOD FAITH”
DOCTRINES
[57] An approach that courts might adopt to determine whether a
particular devaluation or destruction of virtual property was permissible
would be to borrow from the contract law doctrine of “good cause.” In
some jurisdictions, for example, an employer has a recognized interest in
running the business profitably.124 Furthermore, the employer’s interest in
profitability outweighs the employee’s interest in continued
employment.125 The employer does not, however, have unlimited
discretion in firing employees. The employer may fire employees for
legitimate business reasons but not for all reasons,126 and in particular not
for reasons that would contravene public policy.127 Although devaluation
in the context of virtual property is arguably not balanced against the dire
public policy concerns that infect employment termination cases, some of
the analysis used in the employment context could provide useful insight
for courts when considering devaluation.

124

See, e.g., Clement v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 776 P.2d 768, 777 (Idaho 1988) (Huntley, J.,
dissenting).
125
See, e.g., McCone v. New Eng. Tel. and Tel. Co., 471 N.E.2d 47, 50 (Mass. 1984)
(holding that employee’s interest, based on past performance, in potential future
promotions or salary increases does not require employer to continue employment if that
employee was fired for an otherwise legitimate reason).
126
See Cecil v. Cardinal Drilling Co., 797 P.2d 232, 234-35 (Mont. 1990) (citations
omitted). See also Askin v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., No. 85-5120, 1986 WL 16324,
at *2 (6th Cir. Jan. 15, 1986) (citing Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Aff. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,
254-55 (1981)).
127
Employers may not fire employees in retaliation for refusing to perform actions that
would be illegal. See e.g., Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem’l Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1035
(Ariz. 1985) (holding that it was not legitimate to fire an employee who refused to engage
in illegal activity, activity that would be indecent exposure), superseded by statute
Arizona Employment Protection Act, ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 23-1501 (LexisNexis 2005).
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[58] One approach to finding a reasonable balance between the rights of
the game players to virtual property and the financial rights of game
companies would be to allow game companies to devalue virtual property
for legitimate business reasons. Consider Mr. Jacobs’ purchase of the
$100,000 space station.128 If MindArk later determined that there was
“overpopulation” in the game129 and that new land areas were needed to
reduce the overpopulation problem, then MindArk might add a new
“moon” to Project Entropia. The addition of the moon is likely to reduce
the value of Mr. Jacobs’ space station by decreasing the scarcity of land
and thereby decreasing the value of the alienable residences on the space
station.130 In such a scenario, courts might find that MindArk acted for a
legitimate business reason and that the devaluation of the space station
would therefore not be compensable.
[59] Drawing a parallel to good cause may not, however, bring
satisfactory results in every case. Game companies may have legitimate
business reasons for particular actions that would be contrary to what is
just and equitable. Consider again Mr. Jacobs’ purchase of the space
station. Some may consider it legitimate from a business perspective, for
MindArk to give space stations to every player in Project Entropia the
very next day. Such action could make Project Entropia more popular,
allowing MindArk to make more money. It might also allow MindArk to
sell larger quantities of other virtual items – perhaps items that are needed
for a functioning space station. Whereas this appears to be based on a
legitimate business decision, it does not strike one as a fair balance of the
rights of Mr. Jacobs and MindArk. Perhaps the scenario represents,

128

See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
“Overpopulation” in a game may cause, among other things, difficulties in
synchronization and rendering when large numbers of players are all within view of each
other. If players are dispersed, then fewer game players will interact with one another
and, therefore, the synchronizing and rendering problems will be ameliorated.
130
Duncan, supra note 47 (noting that the space station included 1,000 apartment deeds
and 100 store deeds which Mr. Jacobs could sell to other players). On the other hand, if
there really were overpopulation in the game, then the scarcity of land may have
increased and there might be a net increase in the value of the salable portions of Mr.
Jacobs’ space station. For argument’s sake, however, it is assumed that there is a net
decrease in the value of Mr. Jacobs’ space station upon introduction of the new moon.
129
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instead, a situation in which the game company should compensate the
virtual property owner.131
[60] Courts might also consider whether the action on the part of the game
company is a breach of “good faith and fair dealing” in the contract drawn
between the game company and the game player.132 The “doctrine duty of
good faith and fair dealing is implied in every contract . . . [and t]he
boundaries set by the duty of good faith are generally defined by the
parties' intent and reasonable expectations in entering the contract.”133 In
the example above, one might argue that Mr. Jacobs purchased only the
functionality associated with the space station, that the good faith duty of
MindArk extends only to providing those functions, and that the value of
the space station is irrelevant. That is, even if MindArk gave away space
stations to every player in Project Entropia, Mr. Jacobs could continue to
perform all of the functions related to space station ownership, but the
potential economic value of those actions would be greatly diluted or
eliminated completely.134 If these were the only duties of MindArk with
respect to the space station, then the game company arguably would not
have to compensate Mr. Jacobs for his loss. Perhaps, however, merely
providing functionality to Mr. Jacobs “evad[es] . . . the spirit of the
bargain.”135 The duty of good faith could encompass both providing the
functionality and not unduly diluting the value of the rights purchased. If
such were understood to be the implied duty on the part of MindArk, then
flooding the space station market would breach its good faith duty with
respect to the value of Mr. Jacobs’ space station.

131

Even with compensation, this might be economically rational for MindArk if creating
the multitude of space stations provided more value to MindArk than it took from Mr.
Jacobs, so that MindArk would have the surplus to compensate Mr. Jacobs for his loss.
132
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981).
133
Cross & Cross Props., Ltd. v. Everett Allied Co., 886 F.2d 497, 502 (2d Cir. 1989)
(citing Contemp. Mission, Inc. v. Famous Music Corp., 557 F.2d 918, 923 n.8 (2d Cir.
1977) and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981)).
134
Duncan, supra note 47.
135
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205(d) (1981) (noting that a party does not
engage in “good faith performance” of a bargain if they “evad[e] . . . the spirit of the
bargain”).
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[61] Protection of bits in context from unjust devaluation or destruction
also parallels the duty of reasonable care owed by bailees in mutually
beneficial bailments. Traditionally, the duty owed by a bailee to a bailor
was based on whether each party benefited from the bailment. If the
bailment primarily benefited the bailor (e.g., when a bailee finds a bailor’s
lost property), then the bailee’s duty was based on gross negligence. If the
bailment primarily benefited the bailee (e.g., when a bailee borrows a car
from the bailor), then the bailee had a duty to act with great care. If the
bailment benefited both parties (e.g., a hotel storing the valuables of its
customers), then the bailee owed a duty of ordinary and reasonable care.136
Some courts have rejected classifying the duties of bailees based on the
balance of the benefits to the parties of the bailment and instead use a
unified standard of reasonable care under the circumstances of the case.137
[62] In order to see the parallels with bailments it is useful to describe the
duties as if the virtual property were real, were owned by the game player,
and were in the possession of a bailee game company. Such a bailment
would arguably benefit both parties. The game company benefits by
attracting the game player, and the game player benefits by having the
virtual property sustained by the game company. Therefore, the game
company would either owe a duty of ordinary and reasonable care under
the classification system or, equivalently, reasonable care under the
circumstances. One might be able to generally map the duty of reasonable
care to the proposed default rights to bits in context discussed herein.
[63] A duty of reasonable care could inform an analysis of unjust
devaluation or destruction. In the example above, if MindArk devalues
Mr. Jacobs’ $100,000 space station by creating a new, habitable moon,
then the court could look to whether MindArk acted with reasonable care.
The test for reasonable care might parallel the tests for good cause and
good faith, discussed above, by assessing whether MindArk’s actions were
136

8 C.J.S. Bailments § 57 (2005).
Koennecke v. Waxwing Cedar Prods., Ltd., 543 P.2d 669, 673 (Or. 1975) (noting that
“a substantial number of jurisdictions have completely abandoned the concept of
divisibility of diligence and negligence into degrees and, consequently, apply only one
standard of care, that of the ordinary prudent men (sic) under the particular
circumstances.”) (citations omitted). Accord Christensen v. Hoover, 643 P.2d 525, 52930 (Colo. 1982) (citations omitted).
137
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reasonable or whether they followed the spirit of the original bargain. If
MindArk acted with reasonable care, then MindArk’s actions should be
allowed, and it should not be required to compensate Mr. Jacobs.
Otherwise, MindArk should have to compensate Mr. Jacobs. Considering
the examples of destruction of bits in context, the protection of Li
Hongchen’s virtual arsenal from destruction caused by negligence138
should clearly be within the reasonable care owed by Artic Ice in a
mutually beneficial bailment. On the other hand, the loss of virtual
property due to a natural disaster, such as a hurricane, is arguably outside
a game provider’s duty of reasonable care.
[64] Whereas the doctrines of good cause, good faith, and the reasonable
care of bailees might not identically inform an assessment of unjustified
partial devaluation of bits in context, each does provide a familiar
doctrinal basis for constructing such a balance of the rights to bits in
context. This still leaves an important question to be answered: should
courts consider the extent of devaluation? The next section looks to
regulatory takings in order to find what might be appropriate doctrinal
parallels to address that question.
3. DESTRUCTION AND EFFECTIVE TOTAL DEVALUATION: LOOKING TO
REGULATORY TAKINGS
[65] One area of law to which courts can look when deciding whether a
particular change constitutes a total devaluation of virtual property and
whether destruction or devaluation of virtual property should be
compensated is regulatory takings. Regulatory takings occur when
regulations or laws change, thereby changing the value of personal
property.139 If an owner sacrifices all economically beneficial use, she has
138

See supra note 119.
See, e.g., Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 528-29 (1992). Whereas the
government does have a right to change regulations and laws concerning property.
Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 224 (1986). If the regulation
goes too far, it will be recognized as a taking. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
Duncan, 771 F.2d 707, 713 (3d Cir. 1985), aff’d 480 U.S. 470 (1987). Additionally,
complete devaluation is permitted to avoid a nuisance. Kelo v. City of New London, 125
S.Ct. 2655 (U.S. 2005). There is arguably no parallel to nuisance abatement in the virtual
property context.
139
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suffered a taking.140 On the other hand, a taking is less readily found
when the law or regulation is simply adjusting the benefits and burdens of
economic life141 or when the regulation advances a legitimate government
interest and does not take all economic benefit from the owner.142
[66] A court might draw upon the regulatory takings doctrine to help
determine the outcome in a case in which a game company attempts to
“balance” its game. Consider an example in which the game company
alters a game to make particular virtual armor less powerful and thereby
less valuable. Depending on the facts of the case, a court could interpret
this change as balancing the benefits (e.g., protection from virtual attacks
by other characters) and burdens (e.g., difficulty for other characters to
successfully hurt or damage the character wearing the virtual armor)
within the game, and therefore not a taking. If particular virtual armor is
too powerful, then the benefits and burdens of virtual life may too strongly
favor the owners of the virtual armor. This is precisely what game
companies are attempting to correct when they balance the game and thus
change the value of virtual property. Balancing these benefits and burdens
might be seen as a permitted devaluation – a permitted change in context.
[67] A change within a game, such as the balancing of the virtual armor,
might also be seen as advancing a legitimate interest of the game company
and, therefore, as a permitted change in context. In particular, the game
company has a legitimate interest in keeping the game fair and enjoyable
for all game players. If one player’s character is effectively invincible
because of a particular set of virtual armor, then the game will become less
enjoyable for all players who engage in virtual battles with that character.
Notwithstanding the owner’s increased enjoyment due to invincibility, the
aggregate enjoyment within the game, however that may be measured, is
likely to be lower. Maintaining players’ aggregate enjoyment of the game
is certainly a legitimate interest of the game company. Hence, the
140

Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) (citations
omitted).
141
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 488 n.18 (1987)
(citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).
142
Long Cove Club Assoc. v. Town of Hilton Head Island, 458 S.E.2d 757, 758 (S.C.
1995).
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company might have a right to balance the game by making the armor less
powerful, even if that takes some value from the owners of the armor.
[68] On the other hand, if virtual property or the game is changed such
that the virtual property becomes effectively valueless or useless, or if
virtual property is deleted or destroyed, then a court might find that the
change is equivalent to a taking and therefore is prohibited. In the virtual
armor example, if the game is changed such that the virtual armor no
longer protects the player’s character from the virtual attacks of other
characters, the armor becomes so weak that it is valueless, or the armor is
deleted from the user’s inventory, then a court might find that the change
took all benefit from the virtual property owner. The court might rule that,
whether or not the bits still exist in the context of the game, the change is
effectively a prohibited destruction of bits in context.
[69] There are likely other doctrines from which courts might draw upon
to help with the fine distinctions between permitted and prohibited
devaluation and destruction of virtual property. This paper discusses a
few useful doctrines which can provide some guidance to courts: duties of
bailees, good cause, good faith, and takings. The doctrines could be used
separately or in combination. For example, a court might find liability
whenever a game company acts in a way that devalues (or destroys) a
game player’s virtual property if that action: a) was not performed in good
faith or was not for good cause or b) undermines all economically
beneficial use of the virtual property, regardless of whether there was good
cause or whether the game company was acting in good faith. Given that
such a doctrinal choice would not put a threshold on the level of
devaluation needed for potential fault, liability might exist even in the
most mundane cases. Perhaps a more reasonable doctrinal choice would
view undermining all economically beneficial use as a necessary, but not
sufficient, condition for liability. If that threshold were met by destruction
or devaluation of the virtual property, then the court could look to whether
the changes were made for good cause and in good faith. This doctrinal
choice would reduce the breadth of liability to only the cases most
important to game players – those in which virtual property has become
effectively valueless.
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B. THE PERMITTED DESTRUCTION OF CONTEXT
[70] Seemingly to the contrary of the previous section, where I argued that
bits should be protected from unjust destruction or devaluation, here I
argue that virtual property should not be protected in instances where it is
the context, and not the bits in context, that is being destroyed. That is,
game players should not be protected when it is the game, and not their
virtual property within the game, that is being destroyed. To address this
issue, I look first at whether game companies should be forced to continue
to operate games in which players own virtual property. I then discuss
whether game companies should be required to compensate game players
when a game, and thereby their virtual property within the game, is
destroyed. Finally, I look at whether destruction of context should be
permitted for other reasons.
[71] When addressing the wholesale destruction of virtual property that
had existed in the context of a terminated game, there are a number of
reasons why a court might not award specific performance (forcing a
game company to continue to offer a game after it has made a decision to
terminate). A game company is arguably in the best position to decide
when continuation of a game is a net economic benefit, and it has the
incentive to continue games that provide net economic benefits. As such,
if a court is concerned about maximizing economic benefit, then it should
arguably not force a company to continue providing a game after it has
made a decision to terminate. Additionally, forcing the game company to
continue providing the game would violate the company’s right to
terminate the game as it sees fit.143 Forcing game companies to continue
providing games could also implicate a Peevyhouse v. Garland analysis,
whereby a court can award diminution in market value to a contractee in
cases where specific performance would cost more than the worth of the
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See Pittsburgh Lake Erie R. Co. v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n 491 U.S. 490, 507
(1989) (citing Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 268 (1965) (noting
that a company has an absolute right to terminate its business)). On the other hand, one
might argue that termination of a game is a precluded termination of part of a business
unit, if the company provided other games. Textile Workers, 380 U.S. at 268. However,
it might be unreasonable for a company’s right to terminate a game to turn on whether the
company provides other games.
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performance to the recipient.144 The cost to the game company of
maintaining the virtual property could greatly outweigh the benefit to the
game player.145 Therefore, in those cases, a court should not award
specific performance.146
[72] Furthermore, if courts could force game companies to continue
providing games, then the cost of providing games would increase and the
price game players paid would reflect this increase in risk and burden on
the game companies. One should question whether game players are
willing to pay for this type of “insurance.” If players do not want this
specific performance insurance, then, based on the factors noted above,
courts might not force game companies to continue to provide games,
irrespective of the loss of virtual property.
[73] There is an open question, however, as to whether game companies
should compensate game players for their lost virtual property. If courts
forced game companies to compensate game players for the worth of
destroyed virtual property when terminating a game, based on
144

Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1962).
Supra note 143.
146
If a game is a net monetary drain on society, then a game company should arguably
not be enjoined from terminating the game. If a game is losing money and the net present
value (NPV) of the losses is larger than the aggregate value of the virtual property, then
discontinuing the game will be a net benefit to society, notwithstanding the loss of virtual
property. Arguably the net present value of the virtual property should be weighed
against the net present value of the game company’s losses. Given the difficulty of
determining even the present value of virtual property, let alone the potential future value
of virtual property discounted to today’s dollars, I use aggregate virtual property
valuation as a first approximation. If the game company will profit on the game or if the
NPV of any losses is less than the value of the virtual property, then society will lose out
economically by terminating the particular game. There may be more to the situation,
however. It is likely that the game company is trying to increase its profits in the long
run and that a different game would be more profitable: NPV (current game) < NPV
(future game). The cost or benefit to society of the change from one game to another is
based on whether [NPV (new game) + new game virtual property value ] > [NPV (old
game) + old game virtual property value]. If we assume that the worth of virtual
property in the new and old games is similar, then the game company will always be
working toward a higher value to society.
For a discussion of the NPV method, see JAMES D. EDWARDS, ET. AL., HOW ACCOUNTING
WORKS 331-332 (Dow Jones-Irwin 1983).
145
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Peevyhouse, for example, then there might be problems valuing the virtual
property. First, basing valuation on the market prices for virtual items
might be the only reasonable, pragmatic approach.147 Even market price,
however, might not provide a complete picture. Many items, especially
common ones owned or easily found by most players, will not be
priceable if they have never been sold. These items might individually be
of minimal real-world value due to their large supply but might have much
aggregate value. Furthermore, extremely rare items which are never sold
may be unpriceable but might have much value.148 Given the uncertainty
in market value, game companies who would be acting as insurers of the
virtual property would not only increase the price charged to game players
to reflect known market values of virtual property, but would also increase
prices to reflect the risk of potentially large compensation for virtual
property of unknown value. Again, one might question whether this is the
type of insurance for which the game players are willing to pay.
[74] Perhaps it would be better for game players, upon destruction of their
virtual property, to get equivalent amounts of virtual property in a
different game provided by the same game company. This would be ideal
insomuch as it would allow an exchange of virtual goods that might pass
little to no insurance costs to players.149 Such an exchange, however, is
still infected with problems of valuation. It is arguably impossible to
determine the relative value of a virtual item in one game in terms of
virtual items in another game.150 One might consider using real-world
market price as an exchange-rate intermediary. This approach, however,
would suffer the same incompleteness of market information as did the
147

Market price could be based on actual sales. See, e.g., EDWARD CASTRONOVA,
SYNTHETIC WORLDS: THE BUSINESS AND CULTURE OF ONLINE GAMES 2 (University of
Chicago Press) (2005); see also supra notes 7, 14.
148
In UBISoft’s Shadowbane, for example, players can build “guilds,” which are cities
with membership. Shadowbane, http://chronicle.ubi.com/Guilds.php (last visited Dec.
18, 2006). Each guild is created by the players in the game and is unique. It may be
impossible to price any particular one.
149
Since MindArk sells virtual property, replacing destroyed virtual property with virtual
property in a different game may be tantamount to paying a monetary compensation
award. See infra note 159 and accompanying text.
150
For example, is a particular sword in Blizzard Entertainment’s World of Warcraft.
(World of Warcraft, supra note 2), equivalent to a sword, or anything else, in Blizzard’s
Diablo II (Blizzard Entertainment -- Diablo II, http://www.blizzard.com/diablo2 (last
visited Dec. 18, 2006))?
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compensation scheme discussed above. But where information is available
and where no insurance cost would be passed on to the players, it may be a
reasonable way to attempt to make players whole again.151
[75] Even if players were willing to pay the “insurance” price for virtual
property, or if game companies could compensate the loss of virtual
property in one game with the grant of virtual property in another game,
we still might not want to compensate virtual property owners for
termination of the game in which their virtual property lies. In contrast to
the arguments made for protection of bits in context, the termination of a
game is arguably within the reasonable expectations of game players when
they sign up for a game. Most players would expect to play a game and
keep virtual property as long as the game is around – not after the game
company has decided to terminate the game. The company is likely to
hold the same view. Both the players and the game companies know that
there is a risk that providing a game will become costly and, when that
happens, that the game will be discontinued. If the contracting parties had
a “meeting of the minds” about the potential for discontinuation of the
game at the time the user signed up, then the game player should not be
able to receive a windfall when that foreseen condition arises.152
[76] Furthermore, when it comes to protecting virtual property in the
context of a continuing game, it seems rational to favor the rights of the
consumer (the game player). When it comes to addressing the termination
of particular games, it seems rational to favor the actors in the gaming
industry (the game companies). Game companies are in the best position
to promote and grow the gaming industry and will suffer any economic
151

One would still have to address what happens when a game company does not offer
any other online games.
152
Furthermore any reasonable care, good faith, and good cause duties owed by the game
company might all be met. The game company would have presumably been doing its
best to keep the game running and profitable. Presumably the game company acted in
good faith and with reasonable care in attempting to keep its game as profitable as
possible. Additionally, as noted above, there would arguably be good cause, or at least
economic rationality, if the game company decided to terminate a game. In total, the
game company will protect the context, the game, as best it can. If a situation arises in
which the game company was not acting in good faith or did not have a good reason to
terminate the game, then perhaps compensation or specific performance would be
justified.
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hardships that result from ill-advised game terminations. Allowing game
companies to freely terminate games, perhaps without compensating the
virtual property owners, follows this intuition.
[77] The previous sections describe a theory of virtual property that is both
truer to the underlying technology and better represents parties’
expectations than other currently available theories. The next section
addresses the issue of remedies, and what should be available to game
players when a game company fails to uphold a duty with respect to
virtual property.
C. REMEDIES
[78] Above, I argue that there should be no remedy for termination of a
game. There remains an open question, however, of what remedy should
follow a prohibited destruction or devaluation of bits in context. I argue in
this section that the remedy for prohibited destruction of virtual property
should be replacement of the virtual property. I then discuss the options
for remedying the prohibited devaluation of bits in context.
[79] The remedy for destruction of virtual property should be replacement
of the bits in the context of the game. That is, in addition to any related
civil or criminal charges based on fraud or theft (e.g., one might charge the
hacker from Arctic Ice with theft or destruction of property), the legal
system should attempt to replace virtual property and to avoid providing
monetary equivalents. Replacement of the virtual property, as opposed to
providing a monetary equivalent, allows the court to avoid determining the
real-world value of virtual property. As discussed above, determining
real-world value of virtual property may be an intractable task153 and one
for which a court might be ill-equipped. Furthermore, replacement of
destroyed virtual property should have minimal cost.154

153

See note 149 and accompanying text.
Since virtual property in the context of a continued game can be replaced by
appropriately placing integers in the game’s database (supra notes 109-111, 114 and
accompanying text) the game company will bear only a minimal administrative cost for
restoring the virtual property.
154
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[80] Only in cases where replacement is impossible should other
compensation for the destroyed virtual property be considered. This may
not be a common scenario for online games. However, in some online
games, such as Linden Lab’s Second Life,155 it is possible to create
potentially irreplaceable virtual property. Users of Second Life can write
computer programs that represent buildings, vehicles, weapons, games,
and almost anything else that the mind can imagine. If such virtual
property were destroyed, and no backup or record usable to reconstruct the
virtual property existed, then replacement of the virtual property would
effectively be impossible. In such a case, it might be appropriate to
provide another form of compensation, such as those discussed below, for
compensating devalued virtual property.
[81] For prohibited devaluation of virtual property, “replacement” of the
virtual property would be ideal. Restoring the value of unjustly devalued
virtual property would consist of reverting the game, the context, back to
how it was before the devaluation.156 For example, this might consist of
restoring properties of unjustly devalued virtual armor or swords. In other
cases, this replacement or restoration might not be possible. Consider the
arguably unjust devaluation hypothetical considered above wherein
MindArk gave away space stations to every player immediately after
selling one to Mr. Jacobs for $100,000. Restoring the value of Mr.
Jacobs’ space station would consist of destroying all of the space stations
that MindArk had given away. Such destruction would contravene the
rights of the other space station owners.
[82] Where restoration is not possible, monetary damages or equivalent
virtual property might be acceptable compensation. If MindArk began
giving away space stations in Project Entropia after selling one to Mr.
Jacobs, then Mr. Jacobs’ space station would also be valued at or near zero
dollars. Therefore, an appropriate award for Mr. Jacobs could be the
previous value of the space station, $100,000. As noted, above, however,
perhaps courts should avoid awarding monetary damages when possible.

155

Second Life: Your World, Your Imagination, http://secondlife.com (last visited Dec.
18, 2006).
156
See supra section IV.A.
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Avoidable monetary damages unduly increase the cost that consumers will
be charged to play games and could stifle the gaming industry.
[83] Instead of providing game players with monetary compensation, it
may be preferable, where possible, to replace virtual property in a
particular game with equivalently-valued virtual property in that same
game. Since items are often traded in-game and because virtual items in
the same game are often sold in the real-world market, it should be easier
to find equivalent virtual property within the same game than in the intergame scenario considered above.157 Consider a situation where Blizzard
Entertainment unjustly and completely devalued a virtual sword in the
game World of Warcraft. If the virtual sword had been commonly
exchanged in-game among players for a particular set of virtual armor or
for a particular amount of virtual currency, then Blizzard could arguably
make the player whole again by giving the player the virtual currency or
the virtual armor. In this way, compensation would be set by the virtual
market and the game company would not act as insurers of the virtual
property.158
[84] Game players who have suffered unjust devaluation of virtual
property might be made whole again by restoring the game to its previous
state, providing monetary compensation, or providing equivalent virtual
goods. None of the solutions is perfect for every situation. Therefore,
determining a remedy will depend on the information and solutions
available in each case.
157

If the players of the particular game value two virtual items in that game equivalently,
then perhaps a court should also. This is in contrast to the issue discussed above with
respect to game termination. It is arguably harder to justify equating virtual property in
two different games. Supra note 152.
158
This would not be the case for MindArk and Project Entropia. Blizzard does not sell
virtual items for World of Warcraft. Therefore, when replacing one virtual item with
another virtual item, Blizzard bears nothing more than an administrative cost. MindArk,
on the other hand, sells the virtual items to the players. If MindArk is forced to replace
one item of virtual property with another, then MindArk is arguably losing out on the sale
of the later virtual property. For example, if MindArk were to give Mr. Jacobs $100,000
worth of virtual property in exchange for unjustly and completely devaluing his virtual
space station, then MindArk is arguably giving away $100,000 in virtual property that it
could have otherwise sold. For MindArk such virtual-property-for-virtual-property
exchange might be tantamount to a monetary damage award.
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VI. CONCLUSION
[85] This paper proposes that the protection afforded to the “owners” of
virtual property should be based on a conceptualization of bits in context.
The numbers representing the bits, the underlying physical server on
which the bits are stored, and the electronic database in which the bits are
located would, at best, provide obscuring or confusing bases for the
formulation of default rights for virtual property. The bits-in-context
theory provides a more coherent formulation for the rights of the game
players and game companies. Furthermore, although the game player
should have rights to virtual property within the game for as long as the
game exists – regardless of whether the game player found or purchased
the virtual property, game companies should be free to discontinue games,
thereby destroying the context of the bits.
[86] Virtual property represents an economic interest that is clearly
valuable to those who buy, sell, trade, and use it. The market in virtual
property, and society in general, will be better served with legal
protection. For example, at the margin, the protection of virtual property
may reduce crime. Whereas adequate legal protection might not have
stopped one game player’s murder of another when the latter sold the
former’s virtual sword,159 it might prevent similar crimes. If the users
know that there is a legal regime to protect their virtual property interests,
then at least some of the users will avoid crime and choose legal
enforcement instead.
[87] The role of virtual property as discussed herein is limited to
ownership of assets and characters within multi-user, persistent online
games. The issues addressed, however, may not be so limited. As virtual
environments become more ubiquitous and are used in a broader range of
commercial and social enterprises, the types of virtual property will
expand and may include artistic, scientific, and other creations that we, as
159

Sale of Virtual Weapon Leads to a Murder, CANBERRA TIMES (Australia), Apr. 4,
2005 , at A17 (noting that “Qiu Chengwei, 41, stabbed competitor Zhu Caoyuan
repeatedly in the chest after he was told Zhu had sold his ‘dragon saber’, used in the
popular online game Legend of Mir 3”).
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a society, will value more than we do mere online gaming-related virtual
property.160 As such, it is important that we establish default rules and
legal precedents that provide the kind of protection we will want in the
future.

160

The bits-in-context theory may apply to other current issues. Email addresses or
universal resource locators (URLs), for example, may warrant protection only in certain
contexts. When we consider protection for email addresses, for example, we would
usually consider the ability to receive email as a protectable element. That is, we would
not want one person to be able to use another’s email address to receive email. We may
also want to protect an email address from use by a third party as a return address – often
called “email spoofing.” In order to protect these two uses of the bits representing the
email address, we must protect them in the context of use as a routing mechanism. If one
were to illicitly receive email using another’s email address, then they would be using
those bits in the context of message routing – the protected context for email addresses.
If we choose to also protect people from email spoofing, then we would be protecting the
use of the email address again in the context of message routing.
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